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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2233 
___________ 
 
DUJUAN THOMAS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FORT DIX FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-17-cv-02502) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6 and for a Decision on the Issuance of a Certificate of Appealability 
September 28, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: October 23, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant DuJuan Thomas, a federal prisoner currently confined in FCI-Fort 
Dix, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey dismissing his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In 2013, Thomas pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia to conspiracy to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  See E.D. Va. No. 13-cr-00135.  The District Court 
concluded that, because Thomas had two prior convictions that qualified as “controlled 
substance offenses,” he was a career offender under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.  See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Ultimately, the Court imposed a below-Guidelines 
sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment.  Thomas did not appeal. 
 In December 2014, Thomas filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Eastern 
District of Virginia raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The District 
Court denied the motion on the merits.  Thomas again did not appeal. 
 Thomas then filed the petition under § 2241 that is at issue in this appeal.1  In this 
petition, he argued that his convictions under Maryland state law for possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine do not qualify as “controlled substance offenses,” and that he 
therefore should not have been treated as a career offender under the Guidelines.  The 
                                              
1 Venue was proper in the District Court here because Thomas is incarcerated within the 
District of New Jersey.  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004). 
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District Court dismissed the petition, concluding that Thomas’s claim could be raised 
only, if at all, in a § 2255 motion.  Thomas then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its factual 
findings for clear error.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (per curiam).2   
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  “Motions pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge 
their convictions or sentences[.]”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
2002).  As we have explained, “under the explicit terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless a 
§ 2255 motion would be ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ a habeas corpus petition under 
§ 2241 cannot be entertained by the court.”  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538 (quoting § 2255(e)).  
“A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner demonstrates that 
some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording 
him a full hearing and adjudication of his wrongful detention claim.”  Id. at 538.  This 
exception is narrow and applies in only rare circumstances.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 
F.3d 245, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 
170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017). 
                                              
2 While Thomas filed a request for a certificate of appealability (COA), he does not need 
to obtain a COA to proceed with this appeal.  See Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 
F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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 Thomas argues that this exception applies here.  He relies on Mathis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), in which the Supreme Court stressed that, for purposes of 
applying the categorical (or modified categorical) approach, a statute is divisible only 
when it sets forth different elements delineating separate crimes, not when it sets forth 
different means of committing a single crime.  See id. at 2253.3 
 However, Thomas does not identify any portion of Maryland’s possession-with-
intent-to-distribute statute that the sentencing court improperly construed as an element 
rather than a means, and none is apparent to us.  See generally Kyler v. State, 96 A.3d 
881, 898 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (“Pursuant to the statute, the elements of possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine or cocaine base include: (1) possession of CDS 
[controlled dangerous substance]; and (2) circumstances indicating an intent to distribute 
the CDS.”).  Nor does Thomas identify any other argument that Mathis or another 
intervening case has made available to him that he could not have raised in his initial 
§ 2255 motion.  Cf. United States v. Washington, 629 F.3d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(concluding that offense under Maryland law of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine qualifies as a serious drug offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act).  
Therefore, Thomas has not shown that there has been an intervening change in law that 
                                              
3 We have not determined whether § 2255(e)’s saving clause is available when a 
defendant seeks to challenge his career-offender designation, see generally United States 
v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2015), and we need not do so here.   
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negates his designation as a career offender, and § 2241 relief is not available.  See In re 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.4 
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Thomas’s 
request for a COA is denied as unnecessary.   
 
 
                                              
4 In this Court, Thomas argues also that his two Maryland convictions should have been 
treated under the Sentencing Guidelines as just a single offense.  However, he could have 
raised this argument on appeal or in his initial § 2255 motion, so it does not support his 
invocation of § 2241.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251-52; see also Queen v. Miner, 
530 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that § 2241 petitioner could not 
raise issues that “either had been, or could have been, decided in his previous habeas 
action”).   
